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The Theoretical Pragmatism of Luigi Bobbio 
 
 
Antonio Floridia 
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It is hard for me to remember Luigi Bobbio, because of the strong friendship that 
bound us. I met Luigi Bobbio at the beginning of 2006, during the drafting of the Tuscan 
regional law on participation, which was approved at the end of 2007. Luigi, in particular, 
had the task of organizing an international conference (“Le vie della partecipazione”, 
May 2006), in which the models of participation and deliberation that were emerging 
and developing abroad were presented for the first time in Italy. But in those months 
Luigi also collaborated directly to the elaboration of the Tuscan law: we had an intense 
exchange, whose memory lies in the many emails in which we discussed, in detail, the 
possible solutions to the problems we were facing. 
In this article, I will propose some considerations on the contribution of Luigi Bobbio 
to the theoretical reflection and empirical research on participatory and deliberative de-
mocracy and his more recent orientations and research interests. Others may do a better 
job at describing Luigi Bobbio's role in the field of policy analysis. What is certain, how-
ever, is that his fundamental contribution to the issues of participatory and deliberative 
democracy strongly (and, in my opinion, positively) bears the sign of this disciplinary ap-
proach. Democracy does not live in Gordio is the title of his successful book of 1996: a 
work marked by theoretical attention to the complexity of the decisional processes and 
the conflicts that take place within the concrete unfolding of policy-making. And it is 
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based on this theoretical awareness that Bobbio began to look at the role and meaning 
of the "participation" of citizens, thus converging with the new idea that, in the interna-
tional field, went under the name of "deliberative democracy". Bobbio avoided any ho-
listic (or "ideological") view of participation, but this view didn’t lack ideal and normative 
dimensions and implications: at the core of his view there was still the idea (and the 
ideal) of a democracy that, along with its decision-making processes, could and should 
"work" to the best of its possibilities. Therefore, it was fundamental for him to always 
combine theoretical reflection and empirical experimentation (as also happens in the 
essay published in Partecipazione e Conflitto). His intellectual style acted almost as a 
“razor” against formalisms, all-encompassing schemes, and purely verbal solutions. In 
May 2007, for example, Luigi sent me a commentary on the first draft of the regional 
law: 
 
 in my opinion the text is too detailed, a little too complex, and contains some dispo-
sitions that prove to be incomprehensible or that seem useless. I believe that the text 
should be simplified to make it more effective also on a symbolic level. Here are my first 
observations. At the end of the commentary I add a list of possible situations to see how 
the law could work in specific cases. It would be useful to also bring forward other cases 
in the discussion in order to understand how the law dispositions could apply to concrete 
circumstances… 
 
And, immediately afterwards, speaking of the "general principles" of the law, he 
wrote: 
 
I have some doubts about the introduction of the "right to participate". The attribution 
of a right implies: a) the provision of a judicial action in the event that the right is violated, 
but there is no trace of this in the law (and rightly so, I think); b) the specification of the 
subjects who have this right. But this specification is impossible and inappropriate. I won-
der if it would not be easier and more effective to say that the law favors the participation 
of citizens and residents, without introducing the cumbersome concept of right. 
 
But it is not just a matter of intellectual attitude, of course: the essay that Luigi Bobbio 
published in this very journal in 2017 also took cue from precise theoretical questions, 
and in particular from a response to the theoretical challenge to deliberative democracy 
brought by all "antagonistic" or "conflicting" views. But this comparison, for Bobbio, 
could not take place only on the theoretical level: “the only way”, he wrote (2017, p. 
618), “to respond to such questions is to give a close look at what happens in some de-
liberative arenas”. Of course, his view was not simply neo-positivist (as if deliberative 
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democracy were a "theory" of how things are that can be verified empirically),  but an 
attitude that can be properly defined "pragmatist", in the philosophical sense of the 
term: he wished for a constant interaction between concepts and experience, between 
the conceptual models that guide, and are often implicit in, the practices and experi-
ments inspired by these models; but he also advocated the comparison between the 
practices and experiences that often develop without a clear theoretical awareness of 
their own presuppositions, on the one hand, and the interpretative models that can help 
explain their characteristics and improve their "grip" and effectiveness on reality, on the 
other. 
Not surprisingly, the core of Bobbio's theoretical interest, in recent years, was the crux 
of the relationship between participation, deliberation and conflict: this is evidenced, in 
particular, by the introductory essay (Bobbio, Melé 2015) to a monographic section of 
Participations, but also by many other recent interventions; it also emerges from one of 
his most exhaustive and important theoretical contributions (Bobbio 2010a), proposing 
a typology of possible forms of deliberation based on different contexts or settings, and 
on the different cognitive resources of the actors. 
According to Bobbio, "conflict" cannot rise to the role of a passe-partout theoretical 
category: one cannot have an undifferentiated idea of it, nor can one take it as a value 
in itself. There are many types of conflict, not only "vertical" (between Power and the 
subjects that contest it), but also "horizontal", between citizens with deeply different 
ideas, interests and "points of view". In particular, considering the experiences of delib-
erative policy-making, and the cases in which these processes take the form of an "insti-
tutionalized" space (as in the case of the Genoese Dibattito Pubblico that Bobbio ana-
lyzes in the text appeared in Partecipazione e Conflitto), what emerges are indeed the 
"paradoxical relations" between participation and conflict. Even the deliberative spaces 
and processes that are promoted by the institutions (for the most diverse reasons, which 
can be investigated: strategic uncertainty, information deficit, legitimation crisis and 
consequent search for consent) not only fail to make conflict any weaker, but can also 
ignite it and even make it emerge more clearly when it is still in a latent state.  
Luigi Bobbio keenly followed everything that happened "on the field", and had 
reached a very precise conclusion: a) the cases of "institutionalized" participation moti-
vated by openly manipulative and instrumental intentions are much less frequent and 
significant than what many suspicious critics believe; and b) even where such intentions 
are present and verifiable, they lead either to the failure or irrelevance of the participa-
tory process itself or to self-defeating results for their promoters, precisely because the 
reasons for the conflict are always able to emerge (or re-emerge) within and next to the 
deliberative setting. In short, the participation in more or less "institutionalized" policy-
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making processes can not be assessed with the same yardstick that can be adopted when 
participation develops on an antagonistic terrain, that is, when there is a strategic type 
of rationality and what ultimately determines the outcomes of a conflict are the power 
relations between the actors. It makes no sense to compare these two phenomena, alt-
hough, naturally, as Bobbio notes, there are often many "gray zones": hybrid situations, 
in which communication logics and strategic logics coexist. In such cases even public de-
liberation develops simultaneously, and to varying degrees, both on a pragmatic and ep-
istemic level ("improving" a decision thanks to more solid and shared assessments on 
"factual data" and on the means to achieve a given goal), and on ethical-political grounds 
(what values to prioritize, what aims a community may pursue) and very often even on 
a properly moral ground (what is more "right" to do about a given problem, but also how 
"just" and "fair" is the decision procedure).  
Luigi Bobbio was therefore well aware of the need for a theoretical vision that took 
into account the variability of institutional contexts in which public deliberation takes 
place (while not reducing this variability to a mere empirical contingency). And, in recent 
years, he was very attentive to the proposal of a "systemic approach" to deliberative 
democracy (Parkinson, Mansbridge 2012), even though he expressed several doubts and 
objections about it.  Bobbio's was an evolving reflection and, unfortunately, we cannot 
know how he would have developed it. We can only conclude by pointing to a possible 
path on which to further pursue this goal, in the certainty of finding inspiration in Bob-
bio's work. The core of this future research, in my opinion, consists of two crucial 
themes: a) the connection between the "micro" and "macro" dimensions of public de-
liberation; and b) a more complete and clear distinction between the epistemic dimen-
sion of deliberation and its strictly political dimension and, at the same time, the analysis 
of the inescapable intertwining between these two dimensions. 
Some participatory models that are inspired by the principles of deliberative democ-
racy embrace, more or less consciously, an exclusively epistemic purpose: I am referring 
to devices conceived as places of "unpolitical judgment", in which "ordinary" citizens, or 
“citizen representatives” (Urbinati, Warren 2008), are presumed to express an impartial 
vision, capable of escaping the bias of partisan politics. Thus, citizens are conceived as 
citizens-judges, or citizens-spectators, that emit "verdicts", but not as political actors 
who fight for their opinions and their vision of things, in confrontation and dialogue with 
others. These models (or more precisely, these ways of understanding some participa-
tory institutions) can actually be considered as an expression of a "depoliticization" of 
democracy. In fact, they presume that a collective decision cannot be entrusted to con-
flict and mediation, in a public dialogical dimension, between different interests and val-
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ues borne by citizens (and their forms of representation). Rather, they believe that de-
liberation can lead to find the "correct" solution by asking "ordinary" citizens as such. 
There are many serious objections (which I cannot discuss here) to such an approach. 
However, it would be wrong to limit oneself to this criticism: if we embrace the idea that 
there are "deliberative systems", even minipublics or deliberative settings composed of 
small groups of citizens (randomly or otherwise selected) can play a significant role as 
information-gathering places, appropriately inserted in a deliberative sequence, and as 
“part of a wider deliberative decision-making process that involves the people more gen-
erally”  (Parkinson 2006, 34).  
Other deliberative participatory models and devices are rather designed to enhance 
the epistemic properties of deliberation, but not to reach epistemically justified or 
founded decisions or solutions. They are open or inclusive deliberative arenas, which are 
intended as a phase of the policy-making process. These devices can be conceived as 
spaces of social learning and public inquiry, with the aim of including and enhancing 
widespread skills and social knowledge that cannot be contained in the restricted circle 
of the political decision-maker and his technical-bureaucratic apparatus; but they also 
aim to bring out and "treat" the conflicts that develop around a given political decision. 
These processes can lead to a "better" decision, not because it is "true" or correct, but 
because it is democratically more legitimate, capable of incorporating in the deliberative 
process a social patrimony of knowledge, experiences and conflicting "points of view". 
These two approaches are very different and underestimating this difference may be-
come the source of conceptual and political ambiguity. In the first case, some devices or 
institutions can also be interpreted as processes that empty, or replace, the institutional 
forms of political representation (now hopelessly considered prey of a partisan politics, 
which is disapproved of as such).  In the second case, they can be experienced and prac-
tised as forms of public discourse-enrichment, bringing in knowledge and experiences 
that had previously been ignored or marginalised and thus contributing to building the 
agenda of the public sphere and of the institutional sphere of decision-making. 
Political decisions always involve choice and/or mediation between alternative and 
conflicting options. The process that leads to a public decision, i.e. a deliberative system 
that revolves around a public issue, may imply a pragmatic, ethical or moral dimension 
of the discourses and justifications related to each option: decisions are made based on 
discussions regarding values and interests, and expressing the potential compromises 
that can be reached through public dialogue. However, within this process, ‘good’ argu-
ments (arguments that can turn out to be acceptable) can also be those able to appeal 
to shared ‘facts’, to relatively and provisionally solid and effective knowledge and to a 
convincing interpretation of the participants’ common experiences. 
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In the light of these considerations, accusing deliberative democracy of "weakening" 
or "neutralizing" conflict appears to be empirically groundless, but also theoretically in-
correct, because it means only considering a partial and one-sided image of deliberative 
democracy, taken as an ideal model (a sort of "regulatory ideal") that aims at an undif-
ferentiated "consensual" solution to conflicts (an image that some, but only some, de-
liberative theorists, have accredited and divulged). Rather, I believe that deliberative de-
mocracy should be conceived as a theoretical model that looks at the communicative 
and deliberative dimension acting within conflicts that still characterize political and pol-
icy-making processes; it is a critical and normative model, which encourages a dialogic-
deliberative management of the conflicts themselves, well aware that their concealment 
or annulment is neither possible nor desirable. We can well say that the work of Luigi 
Bobbio will help us reflect on these subjects for a long time. 
 
 
References  
 
Bächtiger A.; Niemeyer S., Neblo M.; Steenberger M.R. and Steiner J. (2010), “Disentan-
gling diversity in deliberative democracy: competing theories, their blind spots, and 
complementarities”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 18(1), pp. 32–63. 
Bobbio L. (1996), La democrazia non abita a Gordio. Studio sui processi decisionali poli-
tico-amministrativi, Milano: Franco Angeli. 
Bobbio L. (2010a), Types of deliberation, in “Journal of Public Deliberation”, n. 6(1), arti-
cle 1.  
Bobbio L. (2010b), “Il dibattito pubblico sulle grandi opere. Il caso dell’autostrada di Ge-
nova”, Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche, 1, pp. 119-146. 
Bobbio L. (2016), “La partecipazione imperfetta”, in Sentieri urbani, rivista della sezione 
trentina dell’Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica, 21, www.issuue.com/sentieri ur-
bani/docs/_21 
Bobbio L. (2017), “Neither completely political nor completely unpolitical. The Third Way 
of Deliberative Democracy”, Partecipazione e Conflitto, 10(2), pp. 613-635. 
Bobbio L., Floridia A, (2016), “Quand la sociologie critique devient une glace dé-
formante”, Participations, 3, pp. 251-268. 
Bobbio L., Melé P. (2015), “Les relations paradoxales entre conflit et participation, Par-
ticipations, 3, pp. 7–34  
Floridia A. (2015), “La democrazia deliberativa e i partiti: un incontro impossibile?”, Teo-
ria politica, nuova serie, Annali V, pp. 389-420, 
PACO – SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF LUIGI BOBBIO 
 
275 
 
Floridia A. (2017), From Participation to Deliberation. A Critical Genealogy of Deliberative 
Democracy, Colchester (UK), ECPR Press. 
Habermas J. (1996), Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discursive Theory of 
Law and Democracy, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press (or. ed., 1992, Faktizität und Geltung. 
Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frank-
furt a.M.: Suhrkamp). 
Muirhead R. (2010), “Can deliberative democracy be partisan?”, in Critical Review, 22(2), 
pp. 129–57. 
Muirhead R. (2014). The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age, Cambridge, MA and London, 
UK, Harvard University Press 
Owen D. and Smith G. (2015), “Survey article: deliberation, democracy, and the systemic 
turn”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 23(2), pp. 213–34. 
Parkinson J. (2006), Deliberating in the Real World. Problems of legitimacy in deliberative 
democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Parkinson J. and Mansbridge J. (eds) (2012), Deliberative Systems. Deliberative Democ-
racy at the Large Scale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Urbinati N. and Warren M. (2008), “The concept of representation in contemporary 
democratic theory”, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, pp. 387–412 
Thompson D. F. (2008), “Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science”, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 11, pp. 497-520  
 
